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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION
OF DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15711

JEFF STONE and/or LAKEWOOD
ENTERPRISES, INC., dba NEODENTURE CLINIC,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for contempt of
court on 120 separate violations of a temporary restraining
order wherein appellants had been enjoined from engaging in
the practice of dentistry without a license.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

From a verdict of

guilty the defendants-appellants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this court to affirm the judgment of the court below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts as outlined by appellants and
as supported by the record are correct and accurate.

There

is no need, therefore, to restate them in respondent's brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IMPOSED BY THE
COURT BELOW FOR THE SEPARATE ACTS OF CONTEMPT
COMHITTED BY APPELLANTS WAS PROPER AND IS
SUPPORTED BY LEGAL AUTHORITY.
Appellants argue that the consecutive sentences
imposed upon them for each of the 120 violations of the
restraining order are invalid.

Neither the statutes nor

the cases cited by appellants support this argument on the
facts.
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-1-401, and Utah Code
Annotated, § 76-3-401, simply allow the district court to
exercise its discretion as to whether sentences are to be
served consecutively or concurrently.

The latter section

seems to apply to felonies and states in subpart (3) that
a court can impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode.

These sections cannot

be construed to prohibit an imposition of consecutive sentences for separate acts of contempt.

They are hardly rel-

evant.

-2-
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Appellants cite McCoy v. Severson, 118 U. 502,
for the proposition that at conunon law sentences imposed
at the same time for separate crimes were to run concurrently
unless statute or the court directed otherwise.

In the case

at bar the court directed otherwise.
The cases cited by appellants are all distinguishable from the case at bar.

State v. Willhote, 40 N.J. Sup.

405, 123 A.2d 237; In re Ward, 51 Cal Rptr 272, 64 C.2d 672,
414 P.2d 400, cert denied 385 U.S. 923, 17 L.Ed 2d 147; and
State v. Starlight Club, 17 U.2d 174, 406 P.2d 912, are not
contempt cases and are not factually similar to the case at
bar.

State v. Willhote, supra, involved two closely prox-

imated reckless driving offenses; In re Ward, supra, involved a lesser included offense (robbery); and State v.
Starlight Club, supra, involved statutory violations of
Utah's liquor laws that were induced on different occasions.
Gautreaux v. Gautreaux, 220 La. 564, 57 So. 2d 188; Beck v.
Frontier Airlines, 174 Neb. 172, 116 N.W.2d 281; United
States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148; Yates v. United States, 355
U.S. 66, 2 L.Ed 2d 95; and Codespoti v. Pennsylvania, 418
U.S. 506, 41 L.Ed 2d 912, are contempt cases.

Gautreaux,

supra, stated that each case must be analyzed by itself to
determine whether there are separate acts or one continuous
act.

That case held two closely related outbursts in a

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court proceeding to be one continuous act.

In Beck, supra,

the contempt consisted of a failure for an airline to obey
an affirmative injunction.

The court held the contempt to

be one continuous act but upheld the $12,000 fine ($1,000/
day).
bar.

This case is easily distinguishable from the case at
In Beck, supra, there were no separate acts as in the

case at bar - there was just one period of refusal and inaction.

In both Orman, supra, and

Yate~,

supra, the court

refused to allow consecutive punishments for each refusal
to answer questions in a single court proceeding.

The

court in Orman, supra, explained the reason for its decision, i.e., that the questions related to the same facts
and line of questioning.

In Codespoti, supra, the court

allowed to stand a series of direct, sununary contempt sentences all imposed in a single court proceeding.

None of

these cases are factually close to the case at bar.
As the court in Gautreaux, supra, stated, each
case must be analyzed by itself to determine whether there
are separate acts or just one continuous act.

In the case

at bar, appellants wilfully chose to violate the

restrainin~

order after having been given formal notice of it by personal service.

By appellant Stone's own admission, he made

120 sets of dentures in direct violation of the order.
49)

(R.

Each set was made for a different party under unique
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circumstances.

Appellant Stone was completely aware each

time that his services for a particular individual violated
the order.

Respondent submits that the trial judge cor-

rectly ruled that each of the 120 violations was a separate
act of contempt.

The cases that are factually on point all

recognize that consecutive sentences are proper for separate
acts of contempt.

These cases all support the trial court's

finding of separate acts of contempt.
In Ex Parte Genecov, 143 Tx. 476, 186 S.W.2d 225,
petitioner was charged with thirty-six separate violations
of an injunction forbidding him and others from discharging
pollutants into certain rivers.

The trial judge affixed

his punishment at $50 fine and one day's imprisonment for
each violation, aggregating a total fine of $1,500.00 and
thirty days' imprisonment.

Although the fine was much

greater than the statutory maximum for a single contempt,
the Texas Supreme Court upheld the judgment and stated that
due process had not been violated.

In Rapp v. United States,

et al., 146 F.2d 548, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment
below imposing a fine of $500 for three acts and a 30-day
jail sentence for each of the other three acts.

The judge

ordered the jail sentences to be served concurrently,
presumably due to the "stiffness"of each sentence.

The

appellant had received from six tenants higher rentals than

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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allowed by a previously issued injunction.

For other cases

on point where courts have assessed multiple contempt penalties for violations of an injunction or restraining order,
see Donovan v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.2d 848, 250 P.2d 246;

-

Golden Gate v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 187, 3 P. 628; Solano
Aquatic Club v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. 278, 131 P. 874;
and State v. Mccarley, 74 Kan. 874, 87 P. 743.

Also, see

Kenimer v. State, 81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E.2d 296, where the
court recognized that every day petitioner kept his child in
violation of the court's order (238 days) could be deemed a
separate act of contempt.
It is quite clear from the foregoing authorities
that when separate acts in contempt of an injunction or
restraining order are established, the courts have assessed
penalties for each act and the sentences have run consecutively.

In the case at bar appellant Stone defiantly ad-

mitted to 120 separate acts of contempt, apparently

belieri~

he could flout the law and receive a minimal penalty.
The sentences for each act of one-half day in jail
for appellant Stone and a $100 fine for the appellant corporation are minimal.

It seems obvious that the trial judge

considered the aggregate jail sentence and fine to be just
and simply used the separate acts as part of the computation
to arrive at the proper sentences.

In view of the
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appellants' wilful defiance of the restraining order, it
would do injustice to the judicial system for this court
to adopt appellants' argument that the violations were but
one continuous act and to impose a mere one-half day jail
sentence on appellant Stone and a $100 fine on the corporation.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
holding appellants in contempt for 120 separate acts.
POINT II
THE SENTENCES IMPOSED UPON APPELLANTS ARE
NOT EXCESSIVE AND DO BEAR A REASONABLE
RELATIONSHIP TO THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE.
This court has stated that holding a party in
contempt of court and the making of orders related thereto
are matters that lie within the trial court's discretion,
and that the trial judge's determinations will not be reversed or modified in the "absence of any action in that
regard which is so unreasonable as to be classified as
capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of his discretion."

Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238.

The

trial judge is certainly in the best position to review all
the facts and circumstances and determine the severity of
the penalties.
In light of the facts of this case, it cannot be
said that the trial judge abused his discretion in
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sentencing appellant Stone to sixty days in jail and fining appellant corporation $12,000.

Appellant Stone com-

mitted 120 separate acts in violation of the restraining
order.

These acts were wilful and in direct defiance of

the order.

He had full knowledge of this court's recent

decision that his "denture practice" was encompassed within the practice of dentistry as defined by statute.

He

was given notice of the subsequently issued restraining
order and chose to flout it, apparently thinking he could
get away with a minimal penalty or none at all.
no mitigating factors in this case.

There are

A more open defiance

of a court order than that in the case at bar is unimaginable.

This is the sort of open, unjustified contempt of

the judicial system that thecrime of contempt is meant to
punish.
Appellant Stone argues that since his actions
were not shown to be seriously injurious to the public,
that his sentence should be light.

Apparently this was a

part of his calculated plan to defy the restraining order.
The purpose of criminal contempt is to punish the contemnor
in order to vindicate the authority of the judicial system.
Therefore, the argument of "little public injury" is not
relevant or material to the issues on this appeal.
Appellant Stone also argues that a sixty-day jail
sentence is ludicrous in view of today's sentencing
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standards.

This appears to be yet another consideration

in his calculated plan to defy the order.

Again, the

trial judge is in the best position to determine the sentence and whether or not it is to be suspended in part or
whether the sentences for each act are to run concurrently
or consecutively.
The cases cited by appellants in an effort to
establish that their sentences are excessive are easily
distinguishable.

In Harris v. Harris, 14. U.2d 96, 377

P.2d 1007, the contemnor father had made a substantial effort to comply with the child support decree.

Appellant

in the case at bar made no effort to comply, but quite to
the contrary, chose to flout the order.

In Shotkin v.

Atchison, 235 P.2d 990, the contemnor was not guilty of
numerous acts as in the case at bar, and the failure to
comply in that case seems much less egregious than appellant Stone's open defiance.

Also, in Shotkin, supra, it

was found that the trial court could have easily avoided
the contempt.
The trial judge did not consider a sixty-day
jail sentence for appellant Stone and a $12,000 fine for
the appellant corporation to be excessive.

In light of

appellant Stone's wilful defiance of the restraining order,
the legal substance of which had already been decided by
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this court, it cannot be said that the trial judge abused
his discretion when sentencing appellants.

CONCLUSION
The determination of the trial court in contempt
cases is within that court's discretion and will not be
reversed or modified unless that discretion is abused.
The cases that are factually similar to the case
at bar recognize the power of the courts to impose consecutive sentences upon contemnors for separate acts of concontempt in violation of an injunction or restraining order,
The trial court's finding that appellants are guilty of 120
separate acts of contempt is supported by fact and law and
was not an abuse of discretion.
In view of appellants' open defiance of the restraining order, the sentences and fines imposed were not
excessive and were not an abuse of discretion.

The judgment

of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June,

1978.

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEON A. HALGREN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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